The US shift towards most-favoured nation (MFN) pricing for pharmaceuticals could have significant consequences for the global pharmaceutical landscape. To understand them, we developed a structured impact framework that maps the effects of MFN, and the likely responses to it, across all the key stakeholders: manufacturers, HTA bodies and payers, patients, and policymakers.
In May 2025, President Donald Trump signed an executive order introducing most-favoured nation (MFN) pricing for branded pharmaceuticals in the United States (US). The Trump Administration highlighted that the primary motivation behind the policy was to end ‘global freeloading,’ suggesting that because the US provides the majority of pharmaceutical profit through higher expenditure on innovative medicines, other countries are able to spend relatively less and, therefore, contribute less to pharmaceutical profits and innovation, while still benefitting from innovation.
What is MFN?
The aim of MFN is price convergence: to reduce what Americans spend on medicines and to increase what other countries are spending, with the idea being that this will lead to a more equal contribution by countries to pharmaceutical innovation. From a domestic standpoint, price referencing is the tool by which the Trump Administration aims to achieve lower drug prices and expenditure; abroad, the Administration has announced the use of tariffs to elicit increased expenditure on innovative medicines in ex-US countries.
MFN brings international reference pricing (IRP) to the US. It will implement three different IRP models with different characteristics, including voluntary and mandatory models covering different types of medicines in different Medicare settings: GLOBE, GUARD, and GENEROUS. IRP is a pricing policy also commonly used in other countries, which ties the prices of pharmaceuticals in one country to the prices commanded in a group of select countries that compose the ‘reference basket.’ However, MFN is more consequential as the reference price adopted by the US is equal to the second lowest price among the basket countries (adjusted for purchasing power parity), whereas typical uses of IRP calculate a reference price based on a weighted average of the basket countries’ prices. Moreover, MFN—like IRP more broadly—is anticipated to trigger strategic behaviour from manufacturers. This is again anticipated to be more extreme regarding MFN in the context that pharmaceutical prices in America are estimated to be over 250% of those in peer countries and around 60% of global pharmaceutical profits of international top selling medicines are earned in the US. As such, it is understood that MFN is likely to bring about significant global ripple effects regarding access and pricing for pharmaceuticals as well as health and industrial policy with implications extending far beyond the US.
The US shift towards most-favoured nation (MFN) pricing for pharmaceuticals could have significant consequences for the global pharmaceutical landscape. To understand them, we developed a structured impact framework that maps the effects of MFN, and the likely responses to it, across all the key stakeholders: manufacturers, HTA bodies and payers, patients, and policymakers.
The global MFN impact framework
To map these effects, we undertook a targeted literature review with the aim to comprehensively capture and conceptualise the impact of MFN outside of the US for all relevant stakeholders. Because policy is moving faster than the academic literature, we deliberately included grey literature and informal commentary alongside published research. We searched Europe PMC, Google Scholar, and Google using the same pre-defined search string to capture scientific publications, grey literature, consultancy reports and specialty news coverage on global impacts of MFN. Finally, we followed the approach of Mondal et al., and systematically searched LinkedIn for posts on MFN to cover reflections from all stakeholders that may not be captured in scientific and grey literature. After removing duplicates and filtering for relevant results, we were left with 54 sources, which we analysed and used to conceptualise our MFN global impact framework.
The OHE framework captures the short- and long-term impacts, as well as the potential responses and consequences, for all four relevant stakeholder groups, including manufacturers, health technology assessment (HTA) bodies and payers, patients, and policymakers. Because the pharmaceutical industry is international and the US is the world’s largest drug market, the effects of MFN are global in reach. The framework therefore takes an ex-US perspective, while considering manufacturers, who operate internationally, from a global standpoint. As the sections below show, the four groups are closely linked: each group’s response shapes the choices facing the others.
Figure 1: OHE MFN Impact Framework
Preserve US revenue or keep launching abroad
MFN has had the most immediate effect on manufacturers. Through the voluntary agreements on pricing established between manufacturers and the Trump Administration, as well as the announcement of MFN, manufacturers have been faced with immediate pressure on US revenue. As a result of this, they will have a choice: preserve revenue in the US, or keep launching and earning revenue outside the US, which also protects patient access in reference countries. In practice, preserving US revenue means delaying or forgoing launches in ex-US markets where prices are likely to be referenced.
Both paths carry long-term risks. Namely, if US revenue decreases—due to lower prices resulting from price referencing—manufacturers could see a substantial loss in their global revenue, given that the US accounts for 64-78% of global pharmaceutical revenue. Equally, in the case that US revenue is preserved, volume decreases (due to foregone or delayed launches) abroad could also result in a decrease in global pharmaceutical revenue. Ultimately, the literature suggests that lower global revenue in the long term could weaken innovation incentives and lead to a contraction in R&D investment.
Which path will dominate is not yet clear. Early evidence and statements from industry representatives seem to indicate that they are moving towards volume constriction in ex-US markets, i.e. forego or delay launches —and potentially even withdraw products from markets— if these countries do not increase what they pay for innovation. Conversely, they may also respond by trying to negotiate higher list prices abroad: prominent industry players have announced that they plan to launch medicines in the UK at prices close to those in the US Most likely, manufacturers will tailor their strategies to specific countries, depending on how payers and policymakers respond. Whichever strategies prevail, reduced returns on investment risk reducing the capacity to invest into new R&D and innovation.
Rethinking what to pay for innovation
For payers, MFN’s push for price convergence translates into pressure to restructure their current pricing and value frameworks. As MFN is meant to elicit higher prices abroad, payers may be urged to reconsider their willingness-to-pay or increase what they spend on innovation—this may be through tariff and trade pressures imposed by the US, or due to internal political pressures to preserve patient access domestically.
These shifts may coincide with shifts in value frameworks—such as the consideration of broader societal value elements—which may be used to qualify higher spending. Without changes to pricing frameworks that appropriately reflect a medicine’s value to a country or health system, the long-term effects of this policy could be a misalignment between the new MFN reference pricing strategy and the common value-based HTA assessment in reference countries. Critically, if manufacturers and payers cannot align on what the value of innovation is, payers may see the attractiveness of their pharmaceutical markets decrease, ultimately reducing patient access.
Thus, commentary points to the potential for payers to also react to MFN and respond with their own strategies. Specifically, payers may implement more outcomes-based agreements or managed-access agreements, which make pricing more dynamic and reference pricing more challenging. They may also respond through the strengthening or preserving of confidential rebates, which could allow manufacturers to launch at higher list prices in ex-US markets but maintain relatively low net prices. Ultimately, these strategies would serve to obscure net prices from being ascertained by the US, despite MFN’s focus on ascertaining net prices.
Waiting longer for new medicines
If manufacturers respond to MFN by delaying launches, patients are likely to bear the most direct cost, through slower access to innovation. In some cases, they may even experience the withdrawal of medicines that have already been on the market.
Patients may respond by increasing private spending on medicines to ensure access. MFN, thus, may bring about equity concerns both within and between countries: manufacturers may choose to launch medicines only in specific countries where prices are unlikely to threaten US revenue, and in countries where manufacturers choose not to pursue national reimbursement, a two-tier system may emerge, where only patients able to afford private spending can access specific medicines.
These effects could also compound over time. If MFN significantly reduces global pharmaceutical revenue, the resulting loss could reduce innovation incentives and investment in R&D, resulting in reduced innovation for future generations.
When drug pricing becomes trade policy
Policymakers face many of the same pressures as payers, with trade and industrial policy also in play. They are likely to be faced with pressure to increase spending on innovative medicines, potentially resulting in the formation of trade deals, as seen between the United Kingdom and US. Without additional spending on innovation, policymakers may see the attractiveness of their markets decrease for pharmaceutical launches.
Investment decisions are already shifting. MFN has already resulted in some manufacturers reassessing investment plans, halting European projects, and pledging additional investment in the US. The link between MFN and trade policy may urge policymakers to further consider how health policy and industrial policy are linked moving forward.
To navigate these effects, policymakers may follow the steps of the UK, pursuing a trade deal with the US—after which, the UK saw some renewed interest in investment in its life sciences sector. Otherwise, policymakers may look to shift budgeting strategies to accommodate higher spending on innovation, or —as noted by many commentary pieces on MFN— countries may look to China-based manufacturers to fill any access gaps that emerge.
The bigger picture: what MFN means for innovation, access and geopolitics
Taken together, our review suggests that MFN marks a turning point in the global pricing landscape. The US has long been the dominant market of the pharmaceutical industry and, thus, a key source of funding for R&D. Under MFN, however, lower prices abroad have become a liability, threatening to reduce manufacturer revenue. Three systemic consequences stand out: for innovation, for patient access, and for geopolitics.
For innovation, the longer-term consequences could be considerable, but they are also uncertain. By reducing manufacturer revenues in the US, MFN may ultimately dampen investment in R&D. This outcome is dependent on the success of manufacturers’ strategies to protect revenue, as well as the behaviour of policymakers and payers.
For patient access, the effects may already be visible. Across the European markets referenced in the GLOBE and GUARD models, average launches fell by 43% in the ten months after MFN compared with the ten months before, and some markets have seen products withdrawn altogether, with manufacturers pointing to uncertainty over global pricing conditions. Literature also points to the potential for other policies being implemented concurrently—namely, the EU pharmaceutical package—to incentivise strategies that may compete with those encouraged by MFN.
Geopolitically, the Trump Administration paired the pricing policy with trade measures to try to elicit higher spending on innovation abroad. At the same time, experts expect that China-based manufacturers, benefiting from lower development costs, are well placed to step into any potential access gaps left by manufacturers that forego or delay launches.
Because the policy is so recent, important questions remain open and are not addressed by the literature. It is unclear with what urgency policymakers are responding to MFN and how seriously they may be considering China as an option for medicines supply. Additionally, little discussion has been centred around non-reference countries and how MFN may impact patient access in those countries. Finally, it is unclear how experts anticipate MFN will affect innovation incentives. The framework presented in this Insight Blog offers a way to conceptualise these effects, and OHE’s future research will aim to answer these questions.